Research Projects

Working Papers:

Monetizing Kindness: The Impact of CSR on Hospital Financial Performance (Job market paper)

This paper examines the monetary benefits hospitals receive for fulfilling their social responsibility. Hospitals that provide more charity care, a form of financial aid to low-income patients, experience higher patient revenue and profitability in subsequent periods. This is because offering charity care helps hospitals establish a philanthropic reputation and increases patient demand for their medical services. Using ICU visits as an instrumental variable, I find that increased charity care leads to better financial performance. These results provide an economic rationale for corporations to engage in more corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives.

Presentation: The JCF Special Issue Conference on Ownership and Corporate Social and Sustainable Policies 2023, The University of Utah

What Drives Anomaly Decay? (with Jonathan Brogaard, Huong Nguyen, and Talis J. Putnins)

We examine why asset pricing anomalies decay by decomposing the information in prices. We find that anomalies primarily decay around structural increases in market liquidity. The decomposition of information shows that anomaly decay at decimalization is mainly driven by a decrease in the noise share.  We also find that for other types of anomalies, the decay drivers are different. For instance, risk-based anomalies often diminish after publication because they are the result of data snooping, which leads investors to trade on noisy signals. The results suggest that anomalies are primarily inefficiencies that get corrected through liquidity increases. 

Presentation: AFA Annual Meeting 2024, The University of Utah

Director Network and Forced CEO Turnover (with Jeff Coles, and Albert Wang)

This paper examines the impact of director networks on forced CEO turnover. Using directors’ external connections as a proxy, we find higher turnover rates and stronger turnover-performance in firms with well-connected directors. The effect is pronounced with outside directors, nominating committee members, or prestigious directorships. It is also stronger when connections are central, the director has recent CEO dismissal experience, or both CEO and director are from the same industry. New CEOs appointed by well-connected directors tend to have better managerial skills, higher pay-for-performance sensitivity, favorable market reactions, and improved post-appointment performance. Our results indicate that well-connected directors are more effective monitors due to their informational and professional advantages.

Work-in-Progress:

Pre-sale Practice and Housing Affordability (with Da Huang)

Are Nonprofit Hospital CEOs Overpaid? (with Jeff Coles)